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1 Introduction	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  primary	  goals	  of	  Integrated	  Vehicle	  Health	  Management	  (IVHM)	  is	  to	  detect,	  diagnose,	  
predict,	  and	  mitigate	  adverse	  events	  during	  the	  flight	  of	  an	  aircraft,	  regardless	  of	  the	  subsystem(s)	  from	  
which	  the	  adverse	  event	  arises.	  To	  properly	  address	  this	  problem,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  develop	  technologies	  
that	  can	  integrate	  large,	  heterogeneous	  (meaning	  that	  they	  contain	  both	  continuous	  and	  discrete	  
signals),	  asynchronous	  data	  streams	  from	  multiple	  subsystems	  in	  order	  to	  detect	  a	  potential	  adverse	  
event,	  diagnose	  its	  cause,	  predict	  the	  effect	  of	  that	  event	  on	  the	  remaining	  useful	  life	  of	  the	  vehicle,	  and	  
then	  take	  appropriate	  steps	  to	  mitigate	  the	  event	  if	  warranted.	  These	  data	  streams	  may	  have	  highly	  
non-­‐Gaussian	  distributions	  and	  can	  also	  contain	  discrete	  signals	  such	  as	  caution	  and	  warning	  messages	  
which	  exhibit	  non-­‐stationary	  and	  obey	  arbitrary	  noise	  models.	  At	  the	  aircraft	  level,	  a	  Vehicle-­‐Level	  
Reasoning	  System	  (VLRS)	  can	  be	  developed	  to	  provide	  aircraft	  with	  at	  least	  two	  significant	  capabilities:	  	  
improvement	  of	  aircraft	  safety	  due	  to	  enhanced	  monitoring	  and	  reasoning	  about	  the	  aircraft’s	  health	  
state,	  and	  also	  potential	  cost	  savings	  through	  Condition	  Based	  Maintenance	  (CBM).	  	  Along	  with	  
achieving	  the	  benefits	  of	  CBM,	  an	  important	  challenge	  facing	  aviation	  safety	  today	  is	  safeguarding	  
against	  system-­‐	  and	  component-­‐level	  failures	  and	  malfunctions.	  	  
	  
A	  VLRS	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  component,	  subsystem,	  and	  vehicle-­‐level	  models	  which	  would	  represent	  
connectivity	  and	  potential	  causal	  chains	  of	  failure.	  	  Moreover,	  physics-­‐based	  models	  of	  damage	  
propagation	  for	  certain	  subsystems	  (such	  as	  the	  airframe	  or	  actuators)	  may	  be	  appropriate	  for	  inclusion	  
in	  the	  model.	  Finally,	  data-­‐driven	  methods	  to	  characterize	  interactions	  between	  components,	  
subsystems,	  and	  systems	  may	  be	  appropriate	  for	  the	  design.	  	  	  The	  architecture	  of	  a	  VLRS	  can	  span	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  aircraft	  subsystems	  such	  as	  airframe,	  propulsion,	  avionics,	  and	  software	  system.	  
Vehicle	  level	  reasoning	  takes	  into	  account	  health	  management	  information	  from	  all	  levels	  –	  component,	  
subsystem,	  system,	  and	  fleet-­‐wide.	  	  The	  reasoning	  at	  each	  level,	  which	  has	  its	  own	  requirements	  in	  
terms	  of	  timing,	  processing,	  and	  communications,	  is	  aimed	  at	  disambiguating	  any	  conflicting	  information	  
and	  improving	  situational	  awareness.	  	  The	  level	  of	  Verification	  and	  Validation	  (V&V)	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  VLRS	  
itself	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  aircraft-­‐level	  hazards	  associated	  with	  it.	  	  Advanced	  VLRS	  
concepts	  such	  as	  the	  integration	  of	  data	  from	  airborne	  and	  ground	  systems,	  use	  of	  active	  query	  for	  fault	  
isolation,	  interaction	  with	  the	  flight	  crew,	  and	  characterization	  of	  component,	  subsystem,	  and	  system	  
interactions	  through	  data-­‐driven	  methods,	  will	  likely	  pose	  new	  and	  significant	  verification,	  validation,	  




This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  background	  on	  reasoning	  systems	  that	  were	  first	  developed	  for	  space	  
applications	  and	  then	  discusses	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  vehicle	  reasoning	  system	  with	  aircraft	  applications	  with	  
a	  real-­‐world	  example	  and	  case	  study.	  	  We	  then	  discuss	  some	  critical	  issues	  regarding	  the	  verification	  and	  
validation	  of	  such	  a	  system	  and	  then	  summarize	  with	  a	  section	  on	  conclusions	  and	  future	  work.	  
2 Background	  	  
	  
The	  need	  for	  autonomous	  spacecraft	  and	  rovers	  has	  been	  a	  driving	  force	  for	  the	  development	  of	  
vehicle-­‐level	  reasoning	  technologies.	  	  These	  technologies	  are	  applicable	  for	  both	  unmanned	  aerial	  
vehicle	  and	  next	  generation	  commercial	  aircraft.	  	  This	  section	  describes	  a	  few	  examples	  that	  
demonstrate	  the	  feasibility	  and	  benefits	  of	  reasoning	  systems	  for	  space	  applications.	  	  	  
	  
In	  2004,	  NASA	  uploaded	  Livingstone	  Version	  2	  (LV2)	  software	  to	  the	  EO-­‐1	  satellite	  to	  test	  its	  ability	  to	  
find	  and	  analyze	  errors	  in	  the	  spacecraft’s	  systems	  [1].	  	  Normally	  such	  troubleshooting	  is	  performed	  on	  
the	  ground.	  Tests	  were	  conducted	  to	  automatically	  detect	  and	  diagnose	  simulated	  failures	  in	  the	  
satellite’s	  instruments	  and	  systems.	  	  Livingstone	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  recover	  from	  errors	  to	  
protect	  these	  assets,	  and	  continue	  to	  achieve	  mission	  goals.	  	  	  On	  this	  mission,	  LV2	  also	  monitors	  another	  
software	  application	  that	  controls	  EO-­‐1	  to	  autonomously	  run	  its	  imaging	  system.	  	  If	  EO-­‐1	  does	  not	  
respond	  properly	  to	  the	  software	  control,	  LV2	  detects	  the	  error,	  makes	  a	  diagnosis,	  and	  sends	  its	  
analysis	  to	  mission	  control.	  	  LV2	  compares	  a	  model	  of	  how	  the	  spacecraft’s	  systems	  and	  software	  should	  
perform	  to	  actual	  performance.	  	  If	  the	  spacecraft’s	  behavior	  differs	  from	  the	  model,	  then	  the	  LV2	  
reasoner	  searches	  for	  the	  root	  cause	  and	  gives	  mission	  controllers	  suggestions	  of	  what	  may	  have	  gone	  
wrong.	  	  
	  
Another	  example	  of	  a	  space-­‐related	  reasoning	  system	  is	  Remote	  Agent.	  	  This	  system	  enables	  
autonomous	  planning	  and	  execution	  of	  many	  tasks	  onboard	  the	  spacecraft	  [2].	  	  With	  this	  capability,	  only	  
general	  directions	  are	  commanded	  from	  ground	  controllers	  on	  earth.	  	  This	  allows	  faster	  response	  by	  the	  
spacecraft	  to	  in-­‐flight	  situations	  since	  ground	  controller	  intervention	  is	  limited	  due	  to	  communication	  
delay.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  autonomy	  capability	  is	  needed	  to	  safely	  maneuver	  a	  spacecraft	  in	  a	  hazardous	  
environment	  such	  as	  those	  caused	  by	  micrometeorites.	  The	  Remote	  Agent	  software	  utilizes	  model-­‐
based	  reasoning	  algorithms,	  constraint-­‐based,	  goal-­‐directed	  planning	  and	  execution	  algorithms	  as	  well	  
as	  a	  fail-­‐operational	  fault-­‐protection	  approach.	  	  The	  software	  includes	  a	  planner	  and	  scheduler	  that	  
generate	  time-­‐based	  and	  event-­‐based	  activities	  labeled	  as	  tokens.	  	  The	  executive	  in	  the	  software	  makes	  
decisions	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  knowledge	  of	  the	  spacecraft’s	  state	  of	  health,	  constraints	  on	  spacecraft	  
operations,	  and	  the	  plan	  from	  the	  planner	  and	  scheduler.	  	  The	  executive	  expands	  the	  tokens	  into	  a	  
sequence	  of	  commands	  that	  are	  issued	  directly	  to	  the	  appropriate	  subsystems	  and	  monitors	  the	  
response	  to	  these	  commands,	  and	  reissues	  or	  modifies	  them	  if	  the	  response	  is	  not	  what	  is	  desired.	  	  	   	  
	  
The	  need	  for	  vehicle	  level	  reasoning	  in	  aircraft	  will	  grow	  in	  NextGen	  and	  beyond	  because	  of	  the	  
increasing	  complexity	  in	  aircraft	  and	  the	  higher	  reliance	  on	  automation.	  What	  follows	  is	  an	  overview	  of	  
a	  VLRS	  for	  aircraft	  applications.	  
	  
	  	  
3 Scope	  of	  Vehicle	  Level	  Reasoning	  Technologies	  
The	  primary	  function	  of	  a	  VLRS	  is	  to	  detect	  faults	  and	  failures	  at	  the	  aircraft	  level,	  enable	  isolation	  of	  
these	  faults,	  and	  estimate	  remaining	  useful	  life.	  	  Consider	  characteristics	  of	  some	  typical	  faults	  arising	  in	  
some	  subsystems	  within	  an	  aircraft:	  	  
1. [propulsion]	  Turbine	  blade	  erosion	  is	  a	  natural	  part	  of	  turbine	  aging	  and	  wearing	  of	  the	  
protective	  coating	  due	  to	  microscopic	  carbon	  particles	  exiting	  the	  combustion	  chamber.	  As	  the	  
erosion	  progresses	  over	  time,	  this	  fault	  manifests	  itself	  as	  increase	  in	  fuel	  flow	  and	  gradual	  
degradation	  of	  engine	  performance.	  	  
2. [avionics/software]	  Loose	  wire	  harness	  connectors.	  As	  connector	  pins	  corrode,	  they	  make	  
intermediate	  contact.	  The	  corresponding	  software	  module	  that	  receives	  this	  signal	  registers	  a	  
series	  of	  intermittent	  open	  circuit	  faults	  which	  may	  eventually	  corrupts	  the	  navigation	  software	  
and	  causes	  a	  memory	  overflow	  instantaneously.	  	  
3. [airframe]	  Actuator	  stiction.	  A	  sticking	  actuator	  changes	  the	  dynamic	  response	  of	  a	  control	  loop.	  
The	  feedback	  action	  provides	  some	  degree	  of	  resilience	  making	  this	  problem	  difficult	  to	  detect.	  
Eventually,	  the	  stiction	  progresses	  to	  a	  point	  where	  the	  actuator	  control	  saturates	  and	  the	  
control	  authority	  is	  completely	  lost.	  	  
4. [software]	  	  This	  scenario	  describes	  a	  fast	  progression	  fault	  in	  which	  the	  incoming	  navigation	  data	  
corrupts	  the	  guidance	  software	  (see	  ATSB	  Investigation	  report	  200503722),	  which	  then	  leads	  to	  
an	  incorrect	  solution.	  The	  auto-­‐pilot	  intervenes	  and	  over	  compensates	  using	  the	  engine	  thrust.	  	  
This	  causes	  high	  temperature	  and	  high	  speed	  events	  in	  the	  engine,	  leading	  to	  cascading	  
problems	  in	  the	  generators	  and	  secondary	  power	  distribution	  system.	  Several	  auxiliary	  
electronics	  modules	  react	  to	  the	  power	  glitch.	  	  	  
	  
Broadly	  speaking	  the	  VLRS	  needs	  to	  address	  many	  different	  fault	  scenarios,	  including:	  	  
1. Faults	  whose	  severity	  increases	  with	  time.	  These	  can	  be	  further	  categorized	  based	  on	  the	  time	  
constant	  of	  this	  evolution	  such	  as	  incipient,	  slow	  progression	  or	  fast	  progression.	  	  
2. Binary	  repeating	  faults	  whose	  repetition	  increases	  with	  time.	  These	  can	  be	  further	  categorized	  
based	  on	  the	  time	  interval	  between	  repeats	  such	  as	  constant	  or	  increasing.	  	  
3. Faults	  whose	  effects	  spread	  throughout	  the	  aircraft	  with	  time.	  These	  can	  be	  further	  categorized	  
based	  on	  the	  size	  of	  this	  influence	  such	  as	  local	  (self	  contained)	  or	  widespread.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Adverse	  Events	  Cube	  describing	  the	  VLRS	  
reasoning	  dimensions	  
As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1,	  VLRS	  has	  to	  reason	  
across	  three	  dimensions	  –	  shown	  	  as	  
three	  mutually	  orthogonal	  axes	  labeled	  
time	  evolution	  (with	  extremes	  labeled	  
fast	  and	  slow),	  impact	  propagation	  (with	  
extremes	  labeled	  local	  and	  widespread),	  
and	  symptom	  persistence	  (with	  axes	  
labeled	  intermittent	  and	  sustained).	  	  	  
	  	  
	  
Next	  we	  describe	  typical	  modules	  that	  constitute	  the	  VLRS.	  Central	  to	  the	  VLRS	  are	  two	  notions—
evidence	  and	  failure	  modes.	  Broadly	  speaking	  evidence	  represents	  a	  symptom	  or	  an	  observation,	  the	  
failure	  mode	  is	  often	  an	  abstract	  entity	  that	  can	  be	  mapped	  to	  specific	  corrective	  or	  mitigation	  action.	  In	  
this	  respect,	  a	  failure	  mode	  could	  map	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  with	  a	  physical	  failure	  like	  those	  defined	  by	  the	  
component	  manufacturer,	  or	  a	  condition	  that	  has	  a	  well-­‐defined	  corrective	  action	  (such	  as	  remove	  and	  
replace)	  defined	  in	  the	  aircraft	  maintenance	  procedures.	  Symptom	  evidence	  takes	  several	  forms	  as	  we	  
shall	  discuss	  in	  a	  later	  section.	  The	  four	  functional	  modules	  of	  VLRS	  are:	  inference	  engine,	  system	  
reference	  model,	  learning	  loop	  and	  communication	  interfaces.	  	  To	  facilitate	  the	  description,	  the	  
modules	  are	  numbered	  1	  through	  4	  in	  Error!	  Reference	  source	  not	  found.Error!	  Reference	  source	  not	  
found.Figure	  2.	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Functional	  modules	  in	  a	  Vehicle-­‐Level	  Reasoning	  System.	  
	  
	  
1. Inference	  Engine:	  This	  module	  takes	  into	  account	  health	  evidence	  generated	  from	  all	  
components,	  subsystems,	  and	  systems	  within	  the	  vehicle	  (such	  as	  aircraft)	  to	  produce	  the	  
current	  diagnostic	  state	  or	  predicts	  the	  future	  evolution	  of	  a	  fault.	  	  In	  this	  process,	  it	  produces	  a	  
most	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  all	  the	  symptoms	  provided	  by	  various	  sources;	  creates	  new	  
hypothesis	  to	  track	  multiple	  faults;	  and	  deletes	  hypothesis	  that	  may	  have	  weak	  or	  no	  evidence	  
support.	  	  
2. System	  Reference	  Model:	  The	  necessary	  relationships	  for	  the	  inference	  process	  are	  typically	  
separated	  as	  a	  static	  system	  reference	  model.	  This	  partitioning	  allows	  the	  same	  inference	  
engine	  software	  code	  to	  be	  reused	  on	  multiple	  vehicles	  and	  minimize	  certification	  and	  
qualification	  costs	  for	  deploying	  VLRS	  onboard	  an	  aircraft.	  The	  system	  reference	  model,	  an	  
	  	  
aircraft	  loadable	  software	  module	  describes	  the	  relationship	  between	  evidence	  generated	  at	  the	  
component	  and/or	  subsystem	  level	  and	  failure	  modes	  that	  can	  be	  mapped	  to	  specific	  
maintenance	  or	  correction	  action.	  	  
3. Data	  mining	  and	  learning	  loop:	  Fleet	  modeling,	  data	  mining	  and	  knowledge	  discovery	  methods	  
working	  on	  historical	  data	  can	  detect	  anomalies	  and	  precursors	  to	  critical	  failure	  modes.	  
Discovering	  new	  patterns	  and	  updating	  old	  relationships	  in	  the	  system	  reference	  model	  can	  
improve	  aircraft	  safety	  to	  a	  higher	  level	  continually.	  	  Information	  from	  this	  learning	  loop,	  
resulting	  in	  a	  Δ-­‐change	  in	  the	  reference	  model	  enables	  VLRS	  to	  provide	  accurate	  health	  
assessment	  of	  component,	  subsystem,	  or	  system	  and	  support	  condition-­‐based	  equipment	  
maintenance	  and	  replacement.	  	  	  
4. Communication	  interfaces:	  By	  design,	  VLRS	  takes	  a	  system-­‐wide	  view	  of	  the	  adverse	  event	  
detection	  problem.	  While	  the	  input	  interfaces	  defines	  how	  VLRS	  receives	  health	  information	  
from	  various	  member	  components,	  the	  output	  interface	  defines	  how	  it	  communicates	  its	  
outputs	  to	  the	  flight	  crew	  (displays),	  ground	  maintainer	  (ground	  station)	  or	  a	  flight	  management	  
system	  for	  automatic	  fault	  accommodation.	  	  
	  	  
The	  overall	  objective	  of	  VLRS	  is	  to	  detect	  adverse	  events	  that	  may	  be	  occurring	  in	  the	  vehicle	  currently	  
and	  in	  some	  near	  future.	  Several	  functions	  within	  this	  module	  support	  this	  objective.	  Next	  we	  take	  a	  
closer	  look	  at	  these	  functions.	  Figure	  3	  summarizes	  them	  and	  we	  describe	  them	  below:	  	  	  
To	  detect	  events	  whose	  characteristics	  are	  described	  in	  the	  adverse	  event	  cube,	  the	  VLRS	  needs	  to	  
operate	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  evidence	  generated	  from	  several	  member	  systems	  within	  the	  vehicle.	  While	  the	  
inference	  engine	  should	  not	  depend	  on	  how	  the	  evidence	  was	  generated,	  VLRS	  should	  support	  a	  variety	  
of	  formats	  to	  enable	  the	  member	  system	  to	  express	  their	  evidence.	  A	  monitor	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  an	  
evidence.	  Three	  common	  forms	  of	  monitors	  are:	  	  (1)	  diagnostic	  monitor	  which	  is	  a	  binary	  or	  a	  
probabilistic	  indication	  of	  the	  evidence	  being	  present	  or	  absent,	  (2)	  prognostic	  monitor	  expresses	  the	  
presence	  of	  symptom	  in	  future	  time,	  and	  (3)	  parametric	  monitor	  that	  provides	  a	  time	  series	  signal	  
together	  with	  a	  threshold	  whose	  crossing	  denotes	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  symptom.	  This	  is	  the	  Evidence	  
handling	  function	  within	  the	  VLRS.	  	  
Irrespective	  of	  the	  form	  in	  which	  it	  is	  expressed,	  evidence	  is	  always	  associated	  with	  a	  set	  of	  failure	  
modes	  called	  its	  ambiguity	  group.	  If	  there	  is	  only	  one	  failure	  mode	  in	  this	  set,	  which	  is	  mapped	  to	  a	  
corrective	  action,	  and	  the	  symptom	  associated	  with	  it	  is	  reported,	  then	  the	  current	  aircraft	  fault	  state	  is	  
isolated.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  is	  an	  exception	  than	  a	  rule.	  Analyzing	  the	  overlap	  between	  the	  ambiguity	  
groups	  of	  each	  of	  observed	  symptom	  to	  postulate	  an	  adverse	  event	  that	  can	  explain	  most	  of	  these	  
symptoms	  is	  the	  hypothesis	  generation	  function.	  	  Generating	  and	  updating	  the	  probability	  associated	  
with	  these	  hypothesis	  based	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  observed	  symptoms	  is	  the	  Hypothesis	  handling	  function	  
within	  the	  VLRS.	  	  
VLRS	  typically	  reasons	  with	  evidence	  provided	  by	  various	  components	  or	  member	  systems	  in	  an	  aircraft.	  
However,	  to	  support	  future	  occurrence	  of	  adverse	  events,	  VLRS	  needs	  to	  take	  an	  active	  role	  in	  
generation	  of	  evidence	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  passive,	  data	  gathering	  and	  analysis	  activity.	  In	  this	  context,	  an	  
‘active	  role’	  means	  that	  the	  VLRS	  could	  generate	  and	  test	  internal	  hypotheses	  about	  the	  root-­‐cause	  of	  a	  
particular	  adverse	  event	  by	  selecting	  subsystems	  and	  issuing	  queries	  designed	  to	  verify	  a	  hypothesis.	  	  In	  
	  	  
situations	  where	  there	  is	  contradictory	  information,	  a	  VLRS	  can	  disambiguate	  conflicting	  health	  status	  
through	  passive	  and	  active	  interrogation.	  	  This	  is	  active	  query	  function	  within	  the	  VLRS.	  	  
Interactions	  and	  inter-­‐connection	  between	  various	  subsystems	  cause	  a	  failure	  mode	  in	  one	  subsystem	  A	  
to	  trigger	  monitors	  in	  subsystem	  B.	  In	  addition,	  a	  failure	  mode	  in	  subsystem	  A	  may	  cause	  a	  failure	  in	  
subsystem	  B.	  These	  secondary	  effects	  provide	  cascading	  evidence	  to	  the	  primary	  common	  cause	  failure	  
mode.	  In	  other	  words,	  VLRS	  may	  exonerate	  subsystem	  B	  even	  though	  it	  may	  be	  exhibiting	  an	  indicting	  
symptom.	  This	  is	  the	  cascade	  function	  within	  the	  VLRS.	  	  	  	  
Handling	  intermittent	  symptoms	  is	  an	  important	  function	  of	  VLRS.	  Chatter	  or	  intermittency	  is	  handled	  
by	  a	  simple	  time-­‐based	  latching	  mechanism.	  Time-­‐based	  latching	  requires	  history	  keeping	  and	  looking	  
for	  specific	  temporal	  patterns	  such	  as	  sinusoids	  or	  saw-­‐tooth.	  Once	  the	  pattern	  is	  established	  after	  
analyzing	  the	  symptom	  over	  a	  trend	  window,	  the	  VLRS	  may	  filter	  it	  either	  to	  decrease	  the	  probability	  of	  
the	  prevailing	  fault	  hypothesis.	  This	  is	  the	  temporal	  filter	  function	  within	  VLRS.	  Often	  evidence	  provided	  
by	  a	  group	  of	  monitors	  may	  need	  to	  be	  suppressed	  when	  the	  aircraft	  is	  in	  a	  specific	  operating	  mode.	  For	  
example,	  evidence	  provided	  by	  various	  landing	  subsystem	  monitors	  needs	  to	  be	  suppressed	  while	  the	  
aircraft	  is	  in	  a	  ground	  engine	  test	  mode.	  We	  call	  this	  the	  inhibit	  function.	  While	  some	  of	  this	  inhibition	  
relationship	  can	  be	  derived	  based	  on	  the	  power-­‐up	  state	  of	  member	  systems,	  the	  user	  may	  also	  encode	  
additional	  inhibit	  conditions	  for	  specific	  aircraft	  operating	  modes.	  While	  the	  overall	  objective	  of	  VLRS	  is	  
to	  detect	  and	  diagnose	  ongoing	  failure	  modes	  accurately,	  the	  net	  impact	  of	  this	  prevailing	  fault	  on	  
mission	  completion	  or	  safety	  is	  called	  function	  capability	  function.	  	  
Often	  the	  system	  reference	  model	  builder	  can	  derive	  much	  of	  these	  cascade	  relationships	  by	  following	  
the	  aircraft	  wiring	  and	  component	  layout	  drawings.	  The	  user	  may	  also	  encode	  implicit	  cascade	  
relationships	  in	  the	  system	  reference	  model	  using	  past	  experience.	  	  
The	  VLRS	  that	  is	  described	  here	  comprises	  the	  data	  acquisition,	  management,	  reasoning,	  and	  active	  and	  
passive	  interrogation	  techniques.	  	  These	  properties	  can	  enable	  the	  VLRS	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  advantage	  
over	  traditional	  methods.	  	  However,	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  VLRS	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  explored	  is	  the	  integration	  
with	  the	  control	  system	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  adverse	  events	  may	  occur	  during	  the	  flight	  of	  
the	  aircraft	  and	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  take	  an	  automated	  control	  action	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  
mission.	  	  The	  integration	  of	  the	  VLRS	  into	  the	  control	  loop	  would	  require	  extensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  
flight	  safety	  envelopes	  for	  each	  potential	  fault	  that	  can	  be	  isolated.	  	  These	  safety	  envelopes	  form	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  the	  safe	  operating	  regions	  of	  the	  aircraft	  given	  the	  fault.	  	  Stability,	  maneuverability,	  and	  




Figure	  3.	  Sub-­‐functions	  with	  VLRS	  inferencing	  module	  
4 An	  Example	  
The	  Aircraft	  Diagnostic	  and	  Maintenance	  System	  (ADMS)	  that	  has	  been	  flying	  on	  the	  B777,	  B787	  and	  
business	  jets	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  model-­‐based	  approach	  for	  VLRS.	  While	  the	  ADMS	  does	  not	  embody	  all	  
the	  VLRS	  functions	  described	  earlier,	  we	  present	  this	  example	  to	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  technology	  
choices.	  	  
	  
The	  ADMS	  inferencing	  engine	  handles	  only	  binary	  forms	  of	  evidence,	  i.e.	  a	  diagnostic	  monitor.	  In	  this	  
format,	  an	  evidence	  has	  three	  states:	  indict	  (1)	  or	  exonerate	  (0)	  and	  a	  default	  unknown	  (-­‐1)	  state.	  In	  the	  
indict	  state,	  the	  evidence	  asserts	  that	  one	  of	  the	  failure	  modes	  in	  its	  ambiguity	  set	  may	  be	  occurring	  in	  
the	  system.	  This	  information	  P(fmj=1|ei=1)	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  evidence	  ei	  	  will	  generate	  an	  
indicting	  diagnostic	  monitor	  when	  the	  failure	  mode	  fm	  is	  present	  in	  the	  system.	  A	  bipartite	  graph	  is	  
sufficient	  to	  capture	  this	  relationship,	  however	  the	  system	  reference	  model	  is	  a	  network	  of	  node	  entities	  
such	  as:	  failure	  modes,	  corrective	  actions,	  operating	  modes,	  evidence,	  component	  ID,	  component	  
supplier	  and	  other	  things	  needed	  to	  generate	  a	  maintenance	  work	  order	  automatically.	  	  
Relationships	  to	  support	  the	  cascade	  analysis	  function	  are	  derived	  offline	  by	  tracking	  the	  aircraft	  
component	  connectivity	  and	  layout	  drawings.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ADMS	  implements	  a	  topology	  based	  
cascade	  analysis;	  functional	  and	  causal	  cascade	  are	  explicitly	  programmed	  as	  additional	  links	  in	  the	  
system	  reference	  model	  network.	  Temporal	  filtering	  is	  implemented	  as	  simple	  counter-­‐based	  latching	  
algorithm	  rather	  than	  advanced	  shape	  recognition	  algorithms.	  ADMS	  uses	  a	  passive	  interrogation	  
approach	  to	  VLRS,	  that	  is,	  no	  additional	  data	  from	  a	  particular	  component	  or	  subsystem	  are	  collected	  to	  
improve	  fault	  detection	  and	  diagnosis.	  
Since	  ADMS	  can	  handle	  diagnostic	  monitors,	  the	  overall	  objective	  of	  VLRS,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  to	  detect	  the	  
ongoing	  (at	  the	  present	  time)	  adverse	  events	  that	  explain	  all	  observed	  symptoms.	  As	  described	  earlier,	  
the	  ADMS	  achieves	  this	  by	  generating	  and	  updating	  adverse	  event	  hypothesis.	  Within	  ADMS,	  an	  adverse	  
event	  hypothesis	  is	  tracked	  using	  a	  data	  structure	  called	  fault	  condition	  FC.	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  FC	  
describes	  the	  output	  generated	  by	  the	  VLRS—namely	  ADMS	  in	  this	  case.	  Figure	  4	  shows	  the	  schematic	  
of	  a	  fault	  condition	  within	  ADMS.	  	  
	  
It	  has	  three	  elements:	  (1)	  an	  initiating	  event.	  As	  we	  mentioned	  earlier,	  ADMS	  is	  a	  passive	  form	  of	  VLRS	  
and	  hence	  the	  inferencing	  engine	  is	  triggered	  when	  new	  evidence	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  diagnostic	  monitor	  is	  
presented,	  (2)	  an	  ambiguity	  group	  is	  the	  set	  of	  all	  failure	  modes	  that	  could	  have	  triggered	  this	  evidence.	  
	  	  
This	  is	  calculated	  by	  navigating	  the	  system	  reference	  model	  network,	  (3)	  an	  evidence	  of	  interest	  
constructed	  as	  follow:	  for	  each	  failure	  mode	  in	  the	  ambiguity	  set,	  identify	  all	  evidence	  that	  could	  trigger	  
from	  the	  reference	  model.	  The	  evidence	  of	  interest	  is	  constructed	  by	  taking	  a	  union	  of	  all	  such	  evidence.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Schematic	  of	  a	  fault	  condition,	  which	  represents	  the	  ongoing	  event	  hypothesis	  within	  the	  ADMS	  
The	  overall	  probability	  for	  the	  fault	  condition	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  joint	  probabilities	  of	  any	  of	  the	  failure	  
modes	  in	  the	  ambiguity	  group	  occurring	  given	  the	  diagnostic	  monitors	  (evidence)	  present.	  The	  update	  is	  
a	  simple	  Bayesian	  update,	  where	  the	  apriori	  failure	  mode	  probabilities	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  system	  
reference	  model.	  	  
The	  inference	  engine	  within	  the	  ADMS	  terminates	  when	  the	  failure	  mode	  in	  the	  ambiguity	  group	  
reduces	  to	  one	  or	  a	  set	  of	  failure	  modes	  that	  map	  to	  a	  single	  corrective	  action	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  system	  
reference	  model.	  	  
5 Case	  Study	  
We	  now	  provide	  an	  example	  to	  illustrate	  the	  potential	  safety	  impact	  of	  VLRS.	  The	  example	  surrounds	  an	  
in-­‐flight	  engine	  shutdown	  (IFSD)	  incident	  recorded	  by	  the	  ASIAS	  database.	  The	  flight	  crew	  immediately	  
responded	  and	  per	  the	  operating	  procedures,	  turned	  back	  and	  safely	  landed	  the	  aircraft.	  An	  in-­‐flight	  
engine	  shutdown	  is	  a	  highly	  undesirable	  adverse	  event	  and	  significantly	  impacts	  aviation	  safety.	  There	  
were	  no	  known	  exceedances	  reported	  for	  that	  engine	  in	  the	  recent	  past.	  	  Investigation	  by	  the	  
maintenance	  crew	  indicated	  a	  faulty	  fuel	  metering	  unit,	  which	  if	  detected	  earlier	  is	  a	  routine	  line	  
maintenance	  activity—thereby	  avoiding	  the	  IFSD	  and	  potential	  safety	  impact.	  	  
The	  aircraft	  was	  equipped	  with	  an	  aircraft	  condition	  monitoring	  system	  (ACMS)	  that	  records	  aircraft	  
operational	  parameters.	  Evidence	  provided	  by	  several	  member	  systems	  (including	  the	  engine)	  was	  
analyzed	  by	  the	  ADMS.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  section	  we	  described	  the	  ADMS	  as	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  the	  
overall	  VLRS	  goals	  defined	  in	  section	  3.	  	  In	  this	  case	  study,	  we	  focus	  on	  three	  VLRS	  functions	  (from	  
among	  many	  described	  in	  Figure	  2	  and	  Figure	  3)	  which	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  ADMS.	  These	  are:	  (1)	  an	  
offline	  data	  mining	  step	  to	  discover	  the	  causal	  signature	  surrounding	  this	  adverse	  event.	  This	  analysis	  
could	  be	  accomplished	  based	  on	  the	  parametric	  data	  recorded	  in	  the	  ACMS	  recording	  system,	  (2)	  
updating	  the	  existing	  system	  reference	  with	  these	  newly	  discovered	  evidence,	  (3)	  expanding	  ADMS	  
inference	  engine	  to	  generate	  probabilistic	  diagnostic	  monitors	  for	  the	  newly	  added	  evidence	  through	  
the	  active	  query	  function,	  and	  (4)	  adding	  causal	  cascade	  links	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  topology-­‐based	  cascade	  
	  	  
analysis	  to	  the	  inference	  engine.	  While	  we	  did	  not	  add	  all	  the	  seven	  functions	  a	  VLRS	  should	  encode,	  our	  
objective	  is	  to	  illustrate	  the	  improved	  safety	  impact	  by	  adding	  the	  above	  select	  features	  of	  VLRS.	  That	  is,	  
determine	  if	  we	  could	  detect	  the	  underlying	  fault	  (failure	  of	  the	  fuel	  metering	  unit)	  several	  flights	  before	  
it	  manifested	  as	  the	  IFSD	  adverse	  event.	  This	  early	  notification	  and	  the	  appropriate	  maintenance	  action	  
could	  avoid	  the	  safety	  impact.	  	  	  	  
We	  paraphrase	  the	  incident	  report	  to	  describe	  what	  happened:	  “After	  a	  normal	  takeoff	  one	  of	  the	  
engines	  recorded	  a	  high-­‐temperature	  exceedance,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  temperature	  exceeded	  some	  
pre-­‐specified	  threshold.	  The	  exceedance	  last	  long	  enough	  to	  trigger	  the	  safety	  shutdown	  of	  the	  engine.”	  	  
Message	  trace	  from	  the	  existing	  ADMS	  indicated	  a	  fuel	  metering	  failure	  hypothesis	  was	  formulated	  by	  
the	  inference	  engine,	  however,	  the	  probability	  assigned	  were	  too	  low	  and	  competed	  with	  other	  failure	  
hypothesis	  indicating	  an	  engine	  turbine	  nozzle	  failure.	  In	  any	  case,	  neither	  one	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  were	  
strong	  enough	  to	  generate	  any	  notification	  for	  the	  flight	  or	  the	  maintenance	  crew.	  The	  evolution	  of	  this	  
adverse	  event	  was	  not	  captured	  in	  the	  system	  reference	  model—clearly	  justifying	  the	  need	  for	  an	  offline	  
data	  mining	  learning	  loop	  to	  continuously	  update	  the	  system	  reference	  to	  enable	  the	  VLRS	  to	  detect	  this	  
fast	  event.	  	  	  	  
As	  we	  started	  to	  analyze	  this	  event,	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  how	  a	  faulty	  fuel	  metering	  unit	  would	  have	  
escalated	  to	  an	  over-­‐temperature	  condition.	  We	  employed	  a	  standard	  Tree	  Augmented	  Network	  
Bayesian	  classifier	  to	  discover	  these	  relationships	  and	  hence	  understand	  how	  this	  specific	  fault	  escalated	  
as	  a	  safety	  event.	  We	  used	  the	  parametric	  data	  collected	  by	  the	  ACMS	  from	  the	  last	  50	  flights	  leading	  up	  
to	  engine	  shutdown	  event.	  Details	  on	  the	  data	  mining	  setup	  are	  described	  in	  [4].	  	  
The	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  5.	  On	  the	  left	  hand	  side	  marked	  #1	  in	  Figure	  5,	  we	  summarize	  the	  
causal	  sequence	  of	  events	  discovered	  by	  the	  data	  mining	  step—starting	  from	  the	  fuel	  metering	  actuator	  
fault	  that	  initially	  manifested	  as	  sluggish	  engine	  start.	  	  The	  controller	  compensated	  by	  aggressive	  
schedules.	  At	  some	  point	  the	  controller	  saturated	  which	  resulted	  in	  lower	  idling	  speeds.	  Eventually	  the	  
speed	  dropped	  below	  its	  allowed	  threshold	  triggering	  while	  the	  engine	  exhaust	  gas	  temperature	  (EGT)	  
remained	  high	  triggering	  the	  adverse	  IFSED	  event.	  	  
Second,	  we	  encoded	  this	  newly	  discovered	  knowledge	  as	  a	  Δ-­‐update	  the	  system	  reference	  model.	  These	  
updates	  are	  marked	  #2	  in	  Figure	  5.	  	  This	  implied	  adding	  the	  following	  three	  new	  evidence	  to	  the	  system	  
reference	  model:	  (1)	  time	  when	  the	  engine	  started,	  called	  the	  lightoff	  evidence	  that	  looks	  for	  
abnormally	  long	  engine	  start	  times,	  (2)	  peak	  exhaust	  gas	  temperature	  evidence	  that	  looks	  for	  
abnormally	  high	  exhaust	  gas	  temperature	  during	  engine	  startup,	  (3)	  the	  idling	  engine	  speed	  evidence	  
that	  looks	  for	  abnormally	  high	  and	  abnormally	  low	  speeds	  when	  the	  engine	  is	  idling	  before	  aircraft	  
takeoff.	  The	  two	  existing	  evidences—namely	  over-­‐temperature	  exceedance	  and	  INFSED	  are	  show	  in	  
Figure	  5.	  	  
Third,	  we	  built	  the	  VLRS	  such	  that	  the	  inference	  engine	  exercises	  all	  the	  seven	  functions	  we	  described	  in	  
section	  3.	  The	  actual	  functions	  exercised	  by	  the	  VLRS	  are	  marked	  #3	  in	  Figure	  5.	  	  Finally	  we	  re-­‐ran	  the	  
VLRS	  with	  the	  updated	  reference	  model	  using	  the	  last	  50	  flight	  data	  before	  the	  IFSED	  event	  occurred	  
and	  monitored	  the	  outputs—namely	  the	  fault	  conditions	  as	  described	  in	  section	  4	  and	  marked	  #4	  in	  
	  	  
Figure	  5.	  The	  most	  plausible	  fault	  state	  of	  the	  aircraft	  was	  isolated	  to	  a	  fault	  condition	  that	  contained	  
exactly	  one	  element	  in	  its	  ambiguity	  group—namely	  the	  fuel	  metering	  unit.	  Repeated	  experiments	  with	  
varying	  notification	  threshold	  on	  the	  fault	  condition	  hypothesis	  we	  concluded	  that	  the	  VLRS	  would	  have	  
established	  the	  fuel	  metering	  root	  cause	  anywhere	  from	  20—30	  flights	  before	  the	  IFSED	  event.	  This	  
would	  (in	  theory)	  allow	  the	  maintainer	  to	  fix	  the	  faulty	  component,	  eliminate	  the	  source	  of	  the	  fault	  and	  
hence	  completely	  avoid	  this	  safety	  event.	  	  
While	  this	  single	  event	  may	  be	  statistically	  insufficient	  from	  a	  machine	  learning	  validation	  metrics,	  the	  
clear	  explanation	  discovered	  by	  the	  data	  mining	  method	  and	  the	  Δ-­‐change	  to	  the	  reference	  model	  
together	  with	  a	  VLRS	  seemed	  sufficient	  for	  the	  engine	  domain	  expert	  to	  give	  his	  thumbs	  up.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.	  Impact	  of	  VLRS	  on	  detecting	  events	  that	  led	  to	  an	  in-­‐flight	  engine	  shutdown	  
	  	  
6 Verification	  and	  Validation	  Issues	  
	  
From	  a	  certification	  and	  design	  assurance	  perspective,	  certain	  incremental	  VLRS	  advances	  are	  simple	  
extensions	  to	  existing	  health	  management	  capabilities	  that	  are	  fielded	  today.	  	  Two	  examples	  are	  
monitoring	  for	  multi-­‐engine	  performance	  asymmetry,	  and	  subsystem	  or	  component	  performance	  
	  	  
trending	  across	  multiple	  flights.	  	  In	  these	  cases	  recognized	  industry	  standards	  such	  as	  ARP	  4761	  
“Guidelines	  and	  Methods	  for	  Conducting	  the	  Safety	  Assessment	  Process	  on	  Civil	  Airborne	  Systems	  and	  
Equipment,”	  	  ARP	  4754	  “Certification	  Considerations	  for	  Highly-­‐Integrated	  or	  Complex	  Aircraft	  Systems,”	  
and	  DO-­‐178B	  "Software	  Considerations	  in	  Airborne	  Systems	  and	  Equipment	  Certification"	  	  may	  provide	  
sufficient	  guidance	  for	  certification	  activities	  pertinent	  to	  the	  VLRS	  extensions.	  	  	  	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  V&V	  issues	  arise	  when	  considering	  VLRS	  concepts	  (such	  as	  enriched	  evidence,	  tiered	  
computation	  architecture,	  and	  continual	  data	  mining-­‐based	  reference	  model	  learning)	  that	  are	  more	  
advanced	  than	  component-­‐focused	  health	  management	  systems.	  Following	  are	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  issues	  
that	  may	  arise	  when	  considering	  an	  advanced	  VLRS	  implementation:	  	  
	  
• Large-­‐scale	  integration	  and	  Commercial-­‐Off-­‐the-­‐Shelf	  (COTS)	  -­‐	  The	  large-­‐scale	  integration	  of	  
health	  and	  performance	  data	  from	  subsystems	  and	  components	  that	  were	  designed	  for	  
standalone	  purposes	  will	  require	  agreement	  on	  new	  VLRS	  interface	  standards.	  	  Integrating	  data	  
from	  COTS-­‐based	  systems	  (such	  as	  ground-­‐based	  maintenance	  history	  databases	  or	  archived	  
vehicle	  usage	  data)	  with	  airborne	  systems	  will	  raise	  issues	  such	  as	  guaranteeing	  the	  accuracy	  
and	  integrity	  of	  the	  off-­‐board	  databases,	  and	  addressing	  the	  different	  regulatory	  requirements	  
that	  govern	  the	  certification	  of	  ground-­‐based	  systems	  from	  that	  of	  airborne	  systems.	  	  	  
	  
• Protecting	  intellectual	  property	  -­‐	  Access	  to	  increased	  levels	  of	  health	  and	  performance	  
information	  will	  be	  required.	  	  In	  multi-­‐vendor	  environments	  the	  resulting	  increased	  data	  
exposure	  may	  require	  new	  paradigms	  for	  protecting	  intellectual	  property,	  and	  current	  
approaches	  to	  software	  configuration,	  testing	  suites,	  and	  change	  management	  (field	  upgrades)	  
may	  need	  to	  be	  reexamined.	  	  	  
	  
• Flight-­‐crew	  interaction	  -­‐	  In	  some	  advanced	  VLRS	  concepts,	  the	  flight	  crew	  collaborates	  with	  the	  
health	  monitoring	  automation,	  allowing	  the	  VLRS	  designer	  to	  incorporate	  the	  knowledge,	  agility,	  
and	  diagnostic	  capability	  of	  the	  flight	  crew	  into	  the	  analysis	  algorithms.	  	  However,	  interaction	  
with	  the	  flight	  crew	  greatly	  increases	  the	  required	  V&V	  activities	  because	  new	  hazards,	  such	  as	  
increased	  pilot	  workload	  and	  misleading	  displays,	  are	  introduced	  into	  the	  safety	  assessment.	  	  	  	  
	  
• Interaction	  with	  flight	  controls	  -­‐	  The	  generation	  of	  pre-­‐programmed	  control	  surface	  commands	  
for	  real-­‐time	  aerodynamic	  estimations	  would	  provide	  the	  VLRS	  with	  additional	  capability	  to	  
isolate	  faults	  and	  potentially	  improve	  overall	  health	  state	  assessment.	  	  For	  example,	  manually	  
triggered	  pre-­‐programmed	  surface	  excitations	  may	  be	  invoked	  to	  identify	  performance	  
degradation	  due	  to	  ice	  contamination	  [5].	  	  	  VLRS	  systems	  incorporating	  such	  interrogation	  
capability	  would	  have	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  V&V	  scrutiny,	  because	  anomalous	  
behavior	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  catastrophic	  failure	  condition.	  
	  
• Non-­‐deterministic	  techniques	  -­‐	  In-­‐situ	  data-­‐driven	  approaches,	  such	  as	  machine	  learning	  and	  
certain	  signal	  analysis	  approaches,	  offer	  powerful	  techniques	  for	  diagnostic	  monitoring,	  
prognosis,	  and	  characterization	  of	  interactions	  between	  components	  and	  subsystems	  [6].	  	  The	  
non-­‐deterministic	  aspects	  of	  these	  approaches	  will	  require	  new	  V&V	  tools	  and	  methods	  in	  order	  
to	  gain	  regulatory	  acceptance,	  because	  the	  civil	  aviation	  community	  does	  not	  currently	  permit	  
the	  use	  of	  such	  algorithms	  in	  high	  criticality	  applications.	  	  	  	  
	  
A	  fully	  realized	  VLRS	  will	  be	  a	  complex,	  highly	  integrated	  system	  that	  employs	  connectivity	  and	  failure	  
models,	  data-­‐driven	  and	  probabilistic	  methods,	  and	  system	  and	  subsystem	  interrogation.	  	  The	  system	  
	  	  
will	  require	  large	  amounts	  of	  data	  from	  numerous	  sources	  such	  as	  onboard	  flight	  data,	  component,	  
subsystem,	  and	  system	  health	  and	  performance	  data,	  and	  archived	  historical	  data.	  	  In	  order	  to	  validate	  a	  
VLRS	  capability,	  real-­‐world	  data	  sets	  must	  be	  available	  that	  contain	  well-­‐understood	  and	  documented	  
anomalous	  events,	  including	  data	  archived	  from	  flights	  preceding	  the	  anomalous	  event.	  	  Obtaining	  such	  
data	  is,	  however,	  often	  impossible	  due	  to	  privacy,	  proprietary,	  and	  legal	  concerns.	  	  The	  problem	  will	  be	  
particularly	  severe	  if	  the	  VLRS	  is	  operating	  in	  a	  multi-­‐vendor	  environment	  that	  will	  require	  data	  sharing	  
among	  different	  organizations.	  	  Innovative	  approaches	  to	  this	  problem	  are	  needed	  to	  support	  validation	  
activities	  while	  also	  protecting	  legitimate	  data	  sensitivity.	  
7 Conclusions	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  Vehicle-­‐Level	  Reasoning	  Systems	  (VLRS)	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  sophisticated	  diagnostic	  systems	  
applicable	  to	  deep-­‐space	  applications.	  	  In	  those	  applications,	  the	  VLRS	  enables	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  
autonomy	  and	  mission	  assurance.	  	  In	  aeronautical	  applications,	  most	  modern	  aircraft	  are	  equipped	  with	  
some	  degree	  of	  vehicle	  level	  reasoning.	  	  We	  have	  discussed	  the	  basic	  architecture	  of	  the	  reasoner	  and	  
have	  also	  shown	  the	  different	  types	  of	  data	  monitors	  that	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  overall	  system.	  	  These	  
data	  monitors	  can	  generate	  ambiguity	  groups	  that	  require	  passive	  or	  sometimes	  active	  interrogation	  
techniques	  to	  help	  disambiguate	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  the	  adverse	  event.	  	  We	  have	  discussed	  a	  case	  study	  in	  
which	  a	  conceptual	  VLRS	  could	  identify	  the	  root-­‐cause	  of	  a	  problem	  nearly	  20	  to	  30	  flights	  ahead	  of	  the	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